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Participants  in  the  financial  markets  have  been 
intensely  interested  in  the  monthly  employment 
report  in  recent  years.  Interest  rates  have  fre- 
quently  changed  sharply  following  the  report,  and the 
report  appears  to  have  strongly  influenced  market 
expectations  of Federal  Reserve  policy  actions.  The 
employment  report  for  November  1988,  for  exam- 
ple,  indicated  that  nonfarm  payroll  employment  had 
risen  by  463,000,  which  was well above  the  increase 
expected  by  market  participants  of  about  255,000. 
The  Wall  Street Jozmai’s  financial  market  story  the 
following  day  reported  that  “the  Federal  Reserve  is 
likely,  in  light  of  November’s  strong  employment 
figures,  to  decide  to  raise  short-term  interest  rates 
at  its  policy  meeting  December  14.”  Treasury  bill 
rates  rose  about  25  basis  points  the  day  of  the 
employment  report,  and  the  JoamaL  subsequently 
reported  that  the  Fed  raised  its target  for  the  federal 
funds  rate  on  December  15. 
As this example  suggests,  many  market  participants 
believe  that  Federal  Reserve  policy  actions  in recent 
years  have  been  more  closely  linked  to  the  employ- 
ment  report  than  in  previous  years  and  that  the 
reaction  of rates  to  the  report  at least  partly  reflects 
this  link.  According  to  this  view,  after  the  Fed  de- 
emphasized  the  monetary  aggregates  in  the  early 
1980s  it began  to  place  relatively  greater  emphasis 
on  current  economic  conditions.  The  monthly  em- 
ployment  report  provides  an  early,  comprehensive 
reading  on  the  economic  conditions  of the  previous 
month. 
The  idea  that  market  participants’  reaction  to 
economic  news  is influenced  by  their  expectations 
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of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  response  to  the  news  has 
been  called  the  “policy  anticipations  hypothesis.“’ 
According  to  this  view,  the  Federal  Reserve  makes 
periodic  changes  in  its target  for  the  federal  funds 
rate  in  response  to  new  information,  and  these 
changes  are  highly  persistent  and  seldom  quickly 
reversed.  Treasury  bill rates,  like  other  longer-term 
rates,  are  linked  to  current  and  expected  levels  of 
the  federal  funds  rate  in accordance  with  the  expec- 
tations  theory  of  interest  rates.  Consequently,  the 
reaction  of bill rates  to  economic  news  depends  on 
how  market  participants  expect  the  Fed  to  move  its 
target  for the  funds  rate  in reaction  to this news.  This 
view  implies  that  as  the  economic  and  monetary 
variables  influencing  the  Fed’s  policy  decisions 
change,  so  should  the  market  reaction  to  the  an- 
nouncement  of new  information  on  these  variables.2 
In  this  paper  we  examine  the  reaction  of  interest 
rates  to the  employment  report  since  the  mid-1980s 
and  find  that  it  has  been  significant.  We  then  look 
at  the  reaction  of  interest  rates  to  the  employment 
report  over  a longer  period  of 20 years  and  find  that, 
consistent  with  the  policy  anticipations  hypothesis, 
the  reaction  in  recent  years  has  been  considerably 
stronger  than  it  used  to  be.  In  the  final  part  of  the 
paper  we  illustrate  in  more  detail  how  the  employ- 
ment  report  has  influenced  market  expectations  of 
Fed  policy  actions. 
1 This  term  comes  from  the  money  announcement  literature, 
which  documented  the  reaction  of  interest  rates  to  money 
announcements  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  and  pro- 
posed  a  number  of  explanations  for  this  reaction.  The  most 
widely  accepted  explanation  is  that  the  reaction  reflected  the 
effect  of money  announcements  on  market  participants’  antici- 
pations  regarding  subsequent  Federal  Reserve  policy  actions. 
See  Dwyer  and  Hafer  (1989)  and  Santomero  (1991). 
2 Poole  (1988)  and  Santomero  (199 l),  among  others,  emphasize 
this  point. 
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The  employment  report  for  a  given  month  is 
generally  released  on  the  first  Friday  of the  follow- 
ing  month.  The  most  widely  publicized  and  antici- 
pated  data  in  the  report  is  the  change  in  nonfarm 
payroll  employment.  Two  other  elements  of  the 
report  are  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  revision 
in the  previous  month’s  employment,  which  can  be 
substantial.3  To  examine  the  reaction  of interest  rates 
to the employment  report,  we collected  monthly  data 
for nonfarm  payroll  employment  and  the  unemploy- 
ment  rate as they  were  in&&y  reported  by the Bureau 
of Labor  Statistics  in  its  monthly  publication,  Em- 
phyment  and  Eakzgs. 
We would  expect  interest  rates  to react  only to the 
llnexpected part  of the  announced  changes  in employ- 
ment,  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  revision.4  As 
a proxy  for the  market’s  expectations  of the  change 
in nonfarm  payroll  employment,  we use  survey  data 
from  MMS  International,  which  are  available  start- 
ing  in January  1985.  The  expectations  series  is the 
median  forecast  of a large group  of market  specialists 
surveyed  by  MMS  International.  The  unexpected 
component  of the  employment  announcement  is the 
difference  between  the  actual  change  in employment 
and  the  survey  expectation.  The  unexpected  com- 
ponent  of the  change  in  the  unemployment  rate  is 
calculated  in a similar  way using  survey  expectations 
for the unemployment  rate,  which  MMS  International 
has  collected  since  1980.  Survey  data  on  expecta- 
tions  of the  revision  in employment  are not  available, 
so  in  the  empirical  work  below  we  are  unable  to 
separate  the  expected  and  unexpected  components 
of  the  revision. 
In  addition  to  general  economic  conditions,  two 
factors  affecting  the  monthly  changes  in  nonfarm 
payroll  employment  numbers  over  the  1985-91 
period  were  the  number  of workers  on  strike  each 
month  and  the  number  of government  workers  col- 
lecting  data  for  the  1990  census.  The  survey  data 
on  expectations  are  not  adjusted  for  strikers  and 
3 The  employment  report  also  includes  data  on  hourly  wages 
and  the  workweek.  We  do not  include  these  because  we  do not 
have  expectations  data  for  them  and  because  they  receive 
relatively  little  emphasis  in accounts  of the  market’s  reaction  to 
the  employment  report.  See  Webb  (1989)  for  a description  of 
the  data  in  the  employment  report. 
4 The  reason  is that  if interest  rates  (and,  hence,  security  prices) 
reacted  to  the  expected  component  of these  announcements, 
that  would  imply  that  market  participants  were  ignoring  an easy 
way  to  make  large  profits. 
census  workers  so,  in effect,  the  survey  participants 
have  to  incorporate  their  knowledge  about  strikers 
and census  workers  into their  forecasts.  The  employ- 
ment  report  comes  out  after  the  end  of the  month, 
however,  and it is probably  reasonable  to assume  that 
survey  participants  had  a good  idea  of the  number 
of strikers  and  census  workers  in  the  month  when 
making  their  forecasts.  In  any  case,  neither  the 
actual  employment  numbers  nor  the  survey  expec- 
tations  are  adjusted  for  strikers  or  census  workers, 
so  this  feature  of  the  data  presents  no  problem  in 
this  section  of  the  paper. 
To  measure  the  change  in interest  rates  following 
the  employment  report,  we  use  the  change  in  the 
three-month,  six-month,  and twelve-month  Treasury 
bill  rates  from  the  afternoon  prior  to  the  report  to 
the  afternoon  following  the  report,  as provided  in the 
Federal  Reserve  Board’s H. 15 release.5  We  examine 
the  response  of  interest  rates  to  the  employment 
report  by estimating  the  coefficients  of the  equation: 
ARnt  =  a  +  bl AExpected  Empt 
b2AUnexpected  Emp, 
b3AExpected  URt 
b4AUnexpected  URt 
b5Revt  +  et  (1) 
where  ARn  is  the  one-day  change  in  the  n-month 
Treasury  bill  rate  surrounding  the  employment 
report,  Emp  is employment  as initially reported,  UR 
is the  unemployment  rate  as initially  reported,  Rev 
is  the  revision  in  the  previously  reported  monthly 
employment  figure,6  and  e is an error  term.  The  co- 
efficients  are estimated  over the period  from February 
1985  through  April  199 1. The  starting  point  for the 
regressions  is dictated  by the  availability  of the  MMS 
International  survey  data,  but  as noted  above  it also 
corresponds  roughly  with  the  growing  interest  in the 
employment  report  among  market  participants  as 
indicated  by  the  financial  press. 
On  three  occasions  in  the  1985-91  period  the 
Federal  Reserve  changed  the  discount  rate  on  the 
s All  yields  are  converted  to  a  simple  interest  basis, 
6 We  calculated  the  revision  in  employment  as  the  difference 
between  the  initial  report  of the  monthly  level  of employment 
and  the  next  report  of that  level.  This  computation  includes  revi- 
sions  in the  changes  in employment  for all previous  months.  We 
also calculated  the  revision  as the  revised  change  in employment 
over  the  two  most  recent  months.  The  regression  results  were 
generally  similar,  although  the  revision  calculated  in  the  latter 
way  added  less  to  their  explanatory  power. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1991 same  day  as the  employment  report.  (On  March  7, 
1986,  the  Fed  lowered  the  discount  rate  by one-half 
percentage  point;  on  September  4,  1987,  it  raised 
the  discount  rate  by  one-half  percentage  point;  and 
on  February  1,  199 1,  it  lowered  the  discount  rate 
by one-half  percentage  point.)  Discount  rate  changes 
have  well-documented  effects  on  market  interest 
rates.  To  control  for these  effects,  we  added  to  the 
regressions  a variable  set  equal  to  the  change  in the 
discount  rate. 
ticipants  put  greatest  weight  on  the  payroll  employ- 
ment  figure,  they  also  consider  other  aspects  of the 
employment  report  in evaluating  its likely  effects  on 
interest  rates  and  monetary  policy. 
The  estimates  of  equation  (1)  are  reported  in 
Table  1.  The  estimates  of  the  coefficients  of  the 
expected  components  of the  changes  in employment 
and  the  unemployment  rate  are  not  significantly 
different  from  zero  in  any  of  the  regressions.  The 
coefficients  of the unexpected  change  in employment 
are  positive  and  significantly  different  from  zero  at 
the  1  percent  level  in  all  three  regressions.  The 
coefficients  indicate  that  over  this  period  an  unex- 
pected  increase  of  100,000  in  nonfarm  payroll 
employment  on  average  caused  about  a 5 to  8 basis 
point  increase  in Treasury  bill  rates  on  the  day  of 
the  announcement. 
The  coefficient  of the  revision  in employment  is 
about  one-third  of the  coefficient  of the  unexpected 
component  of employment  in the  most  recent  month. 
The  coefficient  on  the  revision  is  smaller  for  two 
reasons.  First,  market  participants  probably  place  less 
weight  on  more  lagged  data  in  evaluating  the  cur- 
rent  state  of the  economy  and the  Federal  Reserve’s 
likely  response  to  it.  Second,  some  of the  revision 
may  be  anticipated.s 
II.  THEREACTIONOFINTERESTRATES 
TOTHEEMPLOYMENTREPORT 
PRIORTOTHEMID-1980s 
The  coefficients  of the  unexpected  component  of 
the  change  in  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  re- 
vision  are  significant  at the  5 percent  level  in all the 
regressions,  and  these  variables  account  for  about 
one-fourth  of the  explanatory  power  of the  regres- 
sions.7  These  results  suggest  that  while  market  par- 
While  the regression  results  for the  1985-9 1 period 
are consistent  with  the policy  anticipations  hypothe- 
sis,  they  are  also  consistent  with  an  alternative 
hypothesis  called  the  “real  activity  hypothesis.“9 
According  to  the  latter  hypothesis,  a stronger-than- 
expected  employment  report  may  be  signaling  only 
that  the economy  is stronger  than  previously  thought, 
thereby  leading  market  participants  to  raise  their 
7 This  statement  is  made  on  the  basis  of a comparison  of the 
R* of the  regressions  in Table  1 with  the  RZ of unreported  regres- 
sions  that  include  as  independent  variables  only  employment 
or only  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  revision.  These  regres- 
sion  results  and  others  mentioned  but  not  reported  in the  paper 
are  available  from  the  authors,  as  are  the  data  from  Employ- 
ment  and  Eurnings  used  in  the  regressions. 
* N&mark  and  Wascher  (1991,  p.  198) provide  evidence  that 
some  of  the  revision  can  be  forecast.  They  find  that  “incor- 
porating  other  labor-market  information  available  at the  time  of 
the  release  of  the  preliminary  estimate  [of  nonfarm  payroll 
employment]  into  a forecast  equation  for the  first revision  leads 
to a reduction  of about  10 percent  in the  unanticipated  compo- 
nent  of the  revision.” 
9 This  term  also  arose  in  the  early  literature  on  money  an- 
nouncements,  when  this  hypothesis  was  proposed  as an explana- 
tion  for the  reaction  of interest  rates  to money  announcements. 
See  Cornell  (1983,  pp.  647-48). 
Table  1 
The  Reaction  of  Interest  Rates  to  Employment  Announcements,  1985-1991 
AExpected  AUnexpected 
Constant  Em  Em  AExl%cted 
AUnexpected  Discount 
UR  Revision  Rate  R*  DW 
-  ___  -  -  -  - 
AR3  0.61  -0.26  5.31  8.18  -  12.83  1.71  0.20  .59  2.14 
(0.29)  (0.24)  (7.29)**  (0.68)  (2.08)*  (2.74)**  (2.15)* 
AR6  2.56  -  1.49  6.40  1.17  -  20.00  2.37  0.25  .58  2.18 
(0.95)  (1.10)  (6.87)**  (0.08)  (2.54)*  (2.96)**  (2.14)* 
AR12  2.57  -  1.81  7.41  5.82  -  20.56  2.01  0.15  .50  2.24 
(0.78)  (1.09)  (6.49)**  (0.31)  (2.13)*  (2.04)*  (1.07) 
Note:  Treasury  bill  yields  and  the  discount  rate  are  in  basis  points,  employment  is  in  hundreds  of  thousands,  and  the  unemployment  rate  ,is,in 
percentage  points.  Estimation  period  is  February  1985  through  April  1991.  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses.  DW  is the  Durbin-Watson  stabstIc. 
l  denotes  significant  at  5  percent  level  and  **  denotes  significant  at  1  percent  level. 
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stronger-than-expected  report  will be  associated  with 
an  increase  in  Treasury  bill  rates.  Under  this 
hypothesis,  any change  in the  Fed’s  funds  rate  target 
following  the  report  is interpreted  simply  as a con- 
temporaneous  reaction  to the  same  underlying  “real” 
shock.  Hence,  monetary  policy  anticipations  cannot 
be  said  to  have  contributed  to  the  rise  in  bill  rates 
following  the  report. 
The  obvious  way  to  provide  evidence  on  which 
of the  two hypotheses  is right would  be to reestimate 
equation  (1) for the  period  prior  to  1985.  Under  the 
policy  anticipations  hypothesis  we would  expect  the 
reaction  of interest  rates  to  the  unanticipated  infor- 
mation  in  the  employment  report  to  be  greater  in 
a period  when  the  Fed  was  putting  greater  emphasis 
on the  report.  Hence,  if the  coefficient  of the  unex- 
pected  component  of the  employment  report  were 
significantly  greater  in the period  after the  mid-1980s 
than  earlier,  that  would  be  evidence  that  policy 
anticipations  were  affecting  the  market’s  reaction  to 
the  report.  Unfortunately,  we  cannot  conduct  this 
exercise  because  MMS  International  did  not  begin 
to  collect  expectations  data  for  nonfarm  payroll 
employment  until  the  beginning  of  1985.  But  this 
fact in itself suggests  that  market  participants  became 
more  interested  in  the  employment  report  in  the 
mid-1980s  because  they  perceived  it was  becoming 
more  important  in  the  Fed’s  policy  decisions. 
Although  expectations  data  on  nonfarm  payroll 
employment  are not  available  before  198.5, such  data 
on  a wide  variety  of other  macroeconomic  variables 
were  collected  prior  to that  time.  Specifically,  MMS 
International  collected  survey  data  as far back  as the 
beginning  of  1980  for  industrial  production,  the 
unemployment  rate,  the  trade  balance,  the  producer 
price  index,  and  the  consumer  price  index.  Dwyer 
and  Hafer  (1989)  estimate  regressions  from  1980 
through  1987  of changes  in  the  3-month  Treasury 
bill rate  and  the  30-year  Treasury  bond  rate  on  the 
unexpected  component  of  these  government 
statistics.  They  find very  little evidence  of an interest 
rate  response.“*”  In light  of their  finding,  it seems 
lo Dwyer  and  Hafer’s  finding  that  the  unexpected  component 
of  the  unemployment  rate  did  not  affect  interest  rates  in  the 
period  from  1985 through  1987 at fist  appears  inconsistent  with 
the  regression  results  reported  in Table  1. When  we  estimated 
the  regressions  from  1985  through  1987,  however,  the  coeffi- 
cient  of the  unexpected  component  of the  unemployment  rate 
was  not  significant. 
I1 Hardouvelis  (1988)  examines  the  response  of  interest  rates 
and  exchange  rates  to  15 macroeconomic  series  from  October 
1979 to  August  1984.  He  finds  that  markets  respond  primarily 
unlikely  that  the  strong  reaction  of interest  rates  to 
the  unexpected  component  of nonfarm  payroll  em- 
ployment  since  the  mid-1980s  results  solely from  the 
impact  of  this  news  on  the  market’s  perception  of 
the  economy. 
In the  absence  of survey  expectations  for nonfarm 
payroll  employment  prior  to  1985,  we  estimated  an 
autoregressive  time  series  model  and  used  it  to 
generate  a series  of proxy  expectations.  The  steps 
of our  procedure  were  as follows.  (1) We  used  final 
data  (i.e.,  the  latest  revised  historical  series)  on non- 
farm  payroll  employment  to estimate  an autoregres- 
sive  time  series  model  from  1955  through  1970.  In 
this  model,  the  logarithm  of  employment  is  first- 
differenced  and then  regressed  on two lags of itself. l2 
(2)  We  generated  a forecast  of the  change  in  em- 
ployment  for  each  month  (month  t)  from  January 
1971  through  March  1991  using  the  coefficients  of 
the  time  series  model  and  the  employment  figures 
available  in  the  previous  month  (month  t-l)  as 
in&Gy  reported  in ~!G~~,@YLG+N  andEimhgs.  (3) Prior 
to  making  these  forecasts,  we  adjusted  the  initial 
employment  data  for  strikers  and  1990  census 
workers  by  adding  the  former  and  subtracting  the 
latter.  After  making  the  forecasts,  we  subtracted 
strikers  and  added  census  workers  to  get  a predic- 
tion  of  the  actual  employment  numbers.  In  effect, 
we  assumed  that  market  participants  knew  the 
number  of strikers  and  census  workers  prior  to  any 
month’s  employment  announcement.i3 
As  before,  we  subtracted  forecasted  from  actual 
employment  to generate  a series  for the  unexpected 
component  of the  employment  announcement.  Then 
we  estimated  the  regression: 
to  monetary  news,  although  he  also  finds  some  evidence  that 
markets  respond  to  variables  that  reflect  the  state  of  the 
economy. 
I2 The  estimated  coefficients  of  this  model  are  (t-statistics  in 
parentheses): 
AE,  =  .00078  +  .2@?6A$-3  +  .3793A&-2 
(3.06)  (2.99)  (5.59)  R*  =  .24 
I3 The  series  for  1990  census  workers  is from  the  December 
1990  issue  of Emphymtzt  and Earnings.  The  series  for  strikers 
is  from  the  Board  of  Governors.  The  strikers  series  does  not 
begin  until  1968,  so  we  were  unable  to  use  it  to  estimate  the 
autoregressive  model.  We  did,  however,  reestimate  the  model 
after  making  adjustments  for the  steel  strikes  of 1956 and  1959, 
which  were  the  two  major  strikes  of  the  19.5570  period.  We 
used  the  “Highlights”  section  of  the  Etnploytnen~ and  Eumings 
reports  to  estimate  the  effects  of these  strikes  on  the  monthly 
employment  numbers  and  then  used  these  estimates  to 
reestimate  the  autoregressive  model  and  generate  employment 
forecasts.  The  resulting  forecasts  were  very similar to those  made 
without  these  adjustments. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1991 ARnt  =  a  +  bl AExpected  Empt 
+  b2AUnexpected  Emp,  +  et,  (2) 
where  expected  employment  is the  forecast  of the 
change  in employment  and unexpected  employment 
is  the  difference  between  announced  employment 
and  this  forecast. 
Table  2  shows  the  estimates  of  equation  (2)  for 
seven  subperiods  from the  beginning  of 197 1 through 
early  1991.  The  coefficient  of  the  expected  com- 
ponent  of the  change  in employment  is not  signifi- 
cantly  different  from  zero  in any  of the  regressions. 
(Nor  was  the  constant  statistically  significant  in any 
regressions,  and  it is not  reported  in the  table  to con- 
serve  space.)  The  coefficient  of the  unexpected  com- 
ponent  of the  change  in employment  is not  signifi- 
cantly  different  from  zero  in  any  of  the  three  sub- 
periods  in  the  1970s.  The  coefficient  then  jumps 
sharply  in the  period  from  1980  through  1982  and 
is highly  significant.  It then  falls substantially  in the 
1983-84  period,  rises  again  in  the  1985-87  period 
and  stays  high  in the  1988-91  period.14  In the  latter 
two  periods  the  coefficient  is  significant  at  the  1 
percent  level  and  is  only  a  little  lower  than  the 
coefficient  in comparable  regressions  using the  survey 
expectations  data,  shown  at the  bottom  of Table  2. 
These  results  suggest  that  the  autoregressive  time 
series  procedure  is  doing  a reasonably  good  job  of 
mimicking  market  expectations.  l5 
t4 We  also  estimated  equation  (2)  over  one-year  periods,  and 
the  results  were  very  similar  to those  reported  in Table  2. The 
coefficient  of the  unexpected  component  of the  employment  an- 
nouncement  was  statistically  significant  at the  10 percent  level 
in only one  year  (1980)  prior  to  1984,  but  was  significant  at the 
10 percent  level  in each  of the  years  from  1984  through  1990. 
The  coefficient  was  also significant  at the  5 percent  level  in four 
of  the  latter  years  and  in  1980. 
I5 We  did  three  additional  exercises  to check  the  robustness  of 
the  results  reported  in Table  2. Fist,  rather  than  estimating  the 
autoregressive  model  only  once  over  a fixed  period  ending  in 
1970,  we  extended  the  estimation  period  to  month  t-l  prior  to 
forecasting  employment  in month  t. Second,  we forecast  employ- 
ment  without  making  the  adjustments  for  strikers  and  census 
workers  described  in the  text.  Third,  we  added  another  lagged 
term  to the  autoregressive  model.  In each  case  the  interest  rate 
regression  results  were  not  substantially  different  from  those 
reported  in  Table  2. 
Table  2 
























AR3  - 
Unexpected  RVDW  ~  - 
-1.04  .04 
(0.92)  2.07 
1.04  .09 
(0.86)  1.86 
-0.29  .oo 
(0.28)  1.74 
9.14  .27 
(3.38)**  1.85 
1.78  .09 
(1.40)  1.69 
5.11  .32 
(3.86)**  2.20 
4.70  .38 
(4.38)**  2.06 
Estimated  with  Survey  Data 
1985-87  -2.38  5.72  .40 
(0.66)  (4.59)**  1.84 
1988-  0.18  6.36  0.50 
April  1991  (0.17)  (5.87)**  2.11 
Expected 


















AR6  - 
Unexpected  R’IDW 
~  - 
-  1.69  .06 
(1.33)  2.31 
0.61  .08 
(0.56)  1.93 
0.29  .oo 
(0.29)  1.61 
9.47  .32 
(3.97)**  1.69 
2.84  .19 
t2.201*  2.31 
5.98  .29 
(3.65)**  2.38 
6.32  .37 
(4.49)**  2.21 
6.74  .38 
(4.43)**  2.13 
8.30  .49 





















Unexpected  RVDW 
-  0.97  .02 
(0.79)  2.47 
0.10  .05 
(0.09)  1.82 
0.57  .02 
(0.58)  1.92 
10.88  .39 
(4.56)**  1.49 
3.14  .16 
(1.95)  2.47 
6.74  .33 
(3.98)**  2.53 
7.05  .33 
(4.18)**  2.13 
7.49  .40 
(4.61)**  2.22 
9.25  .44 
t5.331**  2.22 
Note:  Treasury  bill  yields  are  in  basis  points  and  employment  is in  hundreds  of  thousands.  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses.  DW  is the  Durbin-Watson  statistic. 
*  denotes  significant  at  5  percent  level  and  l *  denotes  significant  at  1 percent  level. 
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with  the  policy  expectations  hypothesis.  The  co- 
efficients  of the unexpected  component  of the change 
in  employment  in  the  1985-91  period  are  highly 
significant  and much  greater  than  those  in the  1970s 
which  are essentially  zero.  The  reason  for the  strong 
reaction  of  interest  rates  to  the  employment  an- 
nouncement  in the  period  from  1980  through  1982 
is not  clear.i6  These  years  correspond  roughly  to the 
period  from  October  6,  1979,  through  October  9, 
1982,  when  the  Federal  Reserve  went  on  a “non- 
borrowed  reserves”  operating  procedure  intended  to 
improve  its control  of the  money  supply.  Movements 
in the  funds  rate  were  unusually  large  in this  period, 
and  they  were  largely  determined  on  a judgmental 
basis  by  the  Federal  Reserve,  as  they  had  been 
before.”  One  interpretation  of  the  sensitivity  of 
interest  rates  to  the  employment  announcement  in 
this  period  is  that  it  reflected  the  view  of  market 
participants  that  the  Fed  was  reacting  more  aggres- 
sively  to  all  information-money  growth  and  eco- 
nomic  conditions-affecting  its  policy  decisions. 
Hetzel’s  (1986)  description  of the  Fed’s  behavior  in 
this  period  is  consistent  with  this  view. 
III.  THEEMPLOYMENTANNOLJNCEMENT 
ANDMARKETFORECASTS  OF  THE 
FEDERALFLJNDSRATE 
As  a  final  exercise,  we  use  the  financial  market 
stories  of the  Wall Sn-eet  Journal  to illustrate  the  link 
in recent  years  between  the  employment  report  and 
market  expectations  of  Federal  Reserve  behavior. 
Beginning  in late  1988 the .iixmza~  stories  immediately 
following  the  employment  report  regularly  included 
what  can  be  interpreted  as  a  consensus  market 
forecast  of near-term  Fed  policy  actions  conditional 
on  the  report.  These  forecasts  are  summarized  in 
Table  3.  The  table  also  shows  (1)  the  market’s  ex- 
pectation  of the  change  in nonfarm  payroll  employ- 
ment  as reported  by the  Jownal,  (2) the  unexpected 
component  of the  employment  announcement,  and 
(3) the hmafs  reports  of changes  in the  Fed’s  target 
I6 We  reviewed  the  financial  market  stories  in  the  wal/  Street 
Journa/ to investigate  the  possibility  that  this  coefficient  was pick- 
ing up the  effect  of monetary  policy events.  The  Jounro/reported 
six policy  events  that  were  contemporaneous  with  employment 
announcements.  These  included  two  discount  rate  changes,  one 
change  in  the  funds  rate,  a speech  by  Chairman  Volcker,  the 
phase-out  of credit  controls,  and  a large  unexpected  money  an- 
nouncement.  We  reestimated  the  regressions  for  the  1980432 
period  without  these  six  observations.  The  coefficients  of the 
unexpected  component  of the  employment  announcement  were 
smaller  in each  of the  regressions,  but  they  were  still  significant 
at  the  5  percent  level. 
I7 For  detailed  evidence  on  this  point,  see  Cook  (1989). 
for  the  federal  funds  rate,  if  any,  over  the  period 
until  the  following  employment  report.  (The  Jour- 
nal’s  reports  of funds  rate  target  changes  shown  in 
Table  3 are based  on the  perceptions  of participants 
in  the  financial  markets.  They  have  not  been  con- 
firmed  by  the  Federal  Reserve  and  may  not  corre- 
spond  precisely  with  the  timing  of actual  Fed  policy 
changes.) 
Table  3 confirms  that  in the  late  1980s  and  early 
1990s  market  participants  believed  there  was a close 
‘link between  the  employment  report  and  Fed  policy 
actions  and that  market  participants’  forecasts  of Fed 
behavior  were  strongly  influenced  by the  report.  Late 
in the  period  shown  in Table  3,  Fed  policy  actions 
appeared  to  be  especially  closely  linked  to  the 
employment  report.  In  December  1990,  February 
199 1, and March  199 1 the Jimrtza~  reported  that  the 
Fed  changed  its target  for the  funds  rate  later  on the 
same  day  as the  employment  report.  And  in January 
199 1 the  .lbuma~ reported  that  the  Fed  changed  its 
funds  rate  target  on  the  market  day  following  the 
employment  announcement. 
The  near-term  policy  forecasts  recorded  in Table 
3  were  accurate  three-fourths  of  the  time.i8  The 
major  forecasting  error  followed  the  weak  employ- 
ment  reports  of August  and  September  1990,  which 
led  market  participants  to  anticipate  that  the  Fed 
would  lower  its  funds  rate  target.  Following  the 
September  employment  report  the Joumalreported 
that “[i]n a rare  show  of unanimity,  many  economists, 
bond  strategists  and  big investors  are predicting  that 
the  Federal  Reserve  will reduce  short-term  interest 
rates  within  four weeks.”  Yet the  Fed  did not  reduce 
the  funds  rate  target,  and  the  hmzal’s  story  follow- 
ing  the  employment  report  in  October  found  the 
reason  in the  Fed’s  probable  decision  to link  further 
decline  in  the  funds  rate  to  a federal  deficit  reduc- 
tion package.  After agreement  on such  a package  was 
reached  on  Thursday,  October  25,  the  Journal 
reported  that  the  Fed  lowered  its target  for the  funds 
rate  the  following  Monday. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This  article  has  provided  evidence  that  market 
interest  rates  responded  more  strongly  to  the  unex- 
pected  component  of the  employment  report  in the 
is The  policy forecasts  were  accurate  18 times  and wrong  6 times 
(in November  1989,  March  1990, June  1990, July  1990,  August 
1990  and  September  1990).  In  seven  instances  the  forecast 
cannot  be  evaluated  because  the  Journal  did  not  provide  a 
consensus  forecast  or because  the  Fed  reportedly  changed  the 
target  on  the  same  day  as  the  report. 
8  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1991 latter  half of the  1980s  and the  early  1990s  than  they  the  finding  of  the  money  announcement  literature 
generally  did  in  earlier  years.  We  have  also  docu-  that  monetary  policy  anticipations  can  strongly  in- 
mented  the  perception  of market  participants  that  fluence  the  way  market  interest  rates  react  to 
the  Fed’s  month-to-month  policy  decisions  over  this  economic  news.  A corollary,  emphasized  by  Good- 
period  were  heavily  influenced  by  the  report.  A  friend  (1991)  and  Poole  (1988),  is that  movements 
reasonable  conclusion  is that  the  strong  reaction  of  in  market  interest  rates  cannot  be  used  to  extract 
interest  rates  to the  employment  report  in this period  information  about  the  economy  without  an  under- 
largely  reflects  the  greater  impact  of this  report  on  standing  of how  monetary  policy  influences  interest 
expectations  of Fed  policy. This  conclusion  reinforces  rate  expectations. 
Table  3 
Employment  Reports,  Policy  Forecasts,  and  Journal  Reports  of  Funds  Rate  Target  Changes 
Employment 
(thousands) 
Change  in 
Six-Month  Rate 
(Basis  Points)  Actual  Unexpected  -- 
Policy  Forecast  in  Journal  Journal  Report  of  Subsequent 
Financial  Market  Story  Change  in  Funds  Rate  Target 
Announcement 
Date  Expected 
Ott-7-88  283  255  -28  -11 
Nov-4-88  239  323  84  +  16 
Dee-2-88  255  463  208  +28 
Jan-6-89  273  279 
408 
6 
Feb-3-89  292  116 
Mar-lo-89  258  289 




+  12 
+17 
+3 
Friday’s  rally...came  after  government 
figures  indicated  the  economy  isn’t 
expanding  as  rapidly  as  many  people 
had  thought.  Money  managers  quickly 
concluded  that  removed  any  pressure 
on  the  Fed  to  tighten  credit,  at  least 
until  after  Election  Day. 
No  change  in  target 
Hopes  for  a  credit-easing  move  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  have  vanished.  Some 
analysts  even  predict  tighter  credit 
after  the  elections,  especially  if  the 
dollar  drops  in  the  foreign-exchange 
markets. 
Target  raised  late  November 
The  Federal  Reserve  is  likely,  in 
light  of  November’s  strong  employ- 
ment  figures,  to  decide  to  raise  short- 
term  interest  rates  at  its  policy 
meeting  December  14. 
Target  raised  December  15 
[not  available1  No  target  change 
Speculation  that  the  Fed  will  tighten 
credit  soon  grew  Friday  after  the 
government  released  its  January 
employment  report  showing  a  robust 
increase  of  408,000  in  payrolls. 
Target  raised  February  13 
Target  raised  February  23-24 
The  Federal  Reserve  probably  will 
leave  its  credit  grip  unchanged  for  the 
next  few  weeks.  But  many  economists 
think  the  central  bank  will  raise  short- 
term  rates  again  next  month  to  combat 
inflation. 
No  target  change 
Many  analysts  expect  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  to  sit  tight  and  leave 
interest  rates  where  they  are  in  the 
wake  of  the  report. 
No  target  change 
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(thousands) 
Change  in 
Six-Month  Rate 
I  (Basis  Points)  Actual  Unexpected 
-- 
117  -106 
101  -103 
Policy  Forecast  in  Journal  Journal  Report  of  Subsequent 
Financial  Market  Story  Change  in  Funds  Rate  Target 
-  14  April’s  employment  report  makes  it 
highly  unlikely  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  will  decide  to  push  up 
interest  rates  when  its  policy-making 
committee  meets  here  next  week. 
No  target  change 
-26  The  meek  growth  in  new  jobs  last 
month  confirmed  to  many  economists 
that  the  U.S.  economy  is  on  a  slower 
track  and  could  lead  the  Federal 
Reserve  to  ease  its  grip  on  credit  this 
week. 
Target  lowered  June  6 
Target  lowered  July  6 
Announcement 
Date  Expected 
May-5-89  223 
Jun-2-89  204 
Jul-7-89  214  180  -34  -5 
Aug-4-89  158  169  11  +30 
Sep-1-89  70 
Ott-6-89  279 
Nov-3-89  152  233  81  + 18 
Dee-8-89  155  210  55  -8 
110  40 
209  -70 
Jan-5-90  208  142  -66  -4 
Feb-2-90  181  275  94  +4 
-1 
-24 
Many  economists  expect  the  closely 
watched  federal  funds  rate,  which  fell 
to  9%%  Thursday,  to  decline  % 
percentage  point  sometime  soon. 
It  now  appears  that  investors  should 
expect  the  federal  funds  rate  to 
remain  at  about  9%,  according  to 
many  economists  and  analysts.  . . . 
Before  Friday,  many  investors  were 
betting  that  the  Fed  would  allow  the 
rate  to  fall  an  additional  quarter  of  a 
point. 
[not  available1 
Speculation  that  the  Fed  will 
ease  credit  grew  Friday  after  a 
government  report  painted  a  darker 
picture  of  the  economy  than  analysts 
had  expected.  The  report  indicated 
severe  weakening  in  the  manufacturing 
sector. 
The  jobs  data  dashed  hopes  for  an 
immediate  easing  of  interest  rates  by 
the  Federal  Reserve,  and  caused  bond 
prices  to  tumble. 
Many  economists  say  the  latest 
employment  numbers-the  govern- 
ment’s  first  economic  report  for 
November-suggest  the  economy  has 
weakened  to  the  point  the  Fed  may 
decide  to  cut  interest  rates  further. 
But  they  expect  the  central  bank  to 
wait  at  least  until  its  policy-making 
committee  meets  next  Monday 
[December  181  before  taking  any 
action. 
[not  available] 
The  catalyst  for  Friday’s  retreat  was 
a  mixed  bag  of  employment  data, 
which  economists  said  provided  little 
reason  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  alter 
its  credit  policy.  That  policy  appears 
to  be  holding  for  now. 
Target  lowered  July  26 
No  target  change 
No  target  change 
Target  lowered  October  16 
Target  lowered  November  7 
Target  lowered  December  20 
No  target  change 
No  target  change 
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(thousands) 
Change  in 
Six-Month  Rate 
Actual  Unexpected  (Basis  Points) 
Announcement 
Date  Expected 
Mar-g-90  268  372  104 
Apr-6-90  178  26  -152 
May-4-90  384  64  -  320 
Jun-l-90  253  164  -89 
Jul-6-90  -60 















Nov-2-90  -25 
Policy  Forecast  in  Journal  Journal  Report  of  Subsequent 










Just  a  few  weeks  ago,  many  Wall 
Street  economists  were  holding  on  to 
hopes  that  interest  rates  would  soon 
resume  their  downward  drift  and  that 
the  Federal  Reserve  would  cut  short- 
term  rates  once  again.  Now  they 
believe  the  Fed  will  push  rates  higher 
sometime  this  spring. 
Interest  rates  are  likely  to  remain 
relatively  stable  in  the  weeks  ahead 
while  the  Federal  Reserve  keeps  credit 
policy  on  hold,  many  economists 
believe. 
But  the  weakness  in  the  report  led 
many  analysts  to  predict  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  will  refrain  from 
pushing  up  interest  rates  for  now. 
Speculation  that  the  Fed  may  choose 
to  push  rates  lower  began  on  Friday, 
after  the  Department  of  Labor  released 
the  May  employment  report. 
Friday’s  employment  report,  coming 
on  top  of  stronger  than  expected  auto 
sales  data  on  Thursday,  has  convinced 
investors  that  interest  rates  won’t 
fall  significantly  and  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  will  probably  keep  credit 
policy  on  hold. 
Speculation  that  the  Fed  will  soon 
ease  interest  rates  has  been  swirling 
for  weeks,  but  the  prospects  that  such 
an  easing  will  occur  sooner,  rather 
than  later,  were  heightened  on  Friday 
when  the  government  released  a 
bombshell  July  employment  report. 
In  a  rare  show  of  unanimity,  many 
economists,  bond  strategists  and  big 
investors  are  predicting  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  will  reduce  short-term 
interest  rates  within  four  weeks. 
Although  Friday’s  employment  report 
should  have  provided  the  Fed  with 
an  additional  reason  to  lower  rates, 
many  economists  believe  that  by 
linking  lower  interest  rates  to  the 
deficit-reduction  package,  the  Fed  is 
now  paralyzed.  [Deficit  reduction 
agreement  approved  on  Thursday, 
October  25.1 
Then  last  week’s  batch  of  economic 
reports  pointed  straight  toward  reces- 
sion...and  the  Federal  Reserve  is  ex- 
pected  to  ease  interest  rates  further 
before  year  end. 
No  target  change 
No  target  change 
No  target  change 
No  target  change 
Target  lowered  July  13 
No  target  change 
No  target  change 
Target  lowered  October  29 
Target  lowered  November  16 
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(thousands) 
Announcement 
Change  in 
Six-Month  Rate 
Date  Expected  Actual  Unexpected  (Basis  Points) 
Policy  Forecast  in  Journal 
Financial  Market  Story 
-  - 
Dee-7-90  -78  -267  -189  -  14 
Jan-4-9  1  -  149  -76  73  +12 
Feb-l-91  -15  -232  -217  -25 
Mar-8-9  1  -126  -184  -58  -11 
Apr-5-9  1  -167  -206  -39  -2 
Treasury  bond  prices  soared  and 
short-term  interest  rates  fell 
sharply  after  the  government  reported 
unexpectedly  grim  economic  news.,  . . 
The  Fed  reacted  to  the  economic  news 
by  moving  to  nudge  a  key  short-term 
rate  slightly  lower. 
[not  available] 
Prices  of  U.S.  government  bonds 
soared  in  response  to  a  surprisingly 
weak  employment  report  and  a 
slashing  of  the  discount  rate  by  the 
Federal  Reserve. 
The  Federal  Reserve  eased  credit 
another  notch  Friday  . . . .  The  move... 
came  shortly  after  the  [employment 
report]. 
Although  the  Fed  left  interest  rate 
policy  unchanged  on  Friday,  many 
analysts  expect  the  central  bank  to 
reduce  the  federal  funds  rate  another 
notch  sometime  soon. 
Journal  Report  of  Subsequent 
Change  in  Funds  Rate  Target 
Target  lowered  same  day 
Target  lowered  December  19 
Target  lowered  January  8 
Target  lowered  same  day 
Target  lowered  same  day 
Target  lowered  April  30 
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